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1950] NOTES AND COMMENTS 197
same rule would be made applicable in the House? The possibility that
legislation passed without a record vote might be "invalidated" was
suggested by the dissent.3 2
If the Court continues to follow the policy of several of its previous
decisions,33 to the effect that the enrolled bill 34 is conclusive evidence
of enactment, and that no other evidence is admissable to establish that
the bill was not lawfully enacted, such a proposition as is envisioned by
the dissent would seem to be without foundation.
LINDSAY C. WARPEN, JR.
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Conflict with Power of
State to Control Breaches of the Peace
There are inherent inconsistencies between the power of the state
to punish breaches of the peace and the constitutional protections of
the First Amendment. The case of Terminiello v. Chicago' exemplifies
the problem of weighing the sometimes conflicting social interests in
the maintenance of public order and in the free expression of ideas.
The case arose out of an address by Terminiello before an audience
of over eight hundred. About one thousand persons, opposed to his
espoused doctrine of racial and religious supremacy, had gathered about
the auditorium in protest. A police detail, assigned to the meeting,
was unable to prevent several disturbances and minor acts of violence.
The speech itself viciously attacked various political and racial groups.
The general setting, then, was an address, pseudopolitical in nature, but
scurrilous and opprobrious in content, delivered in an auditorium sur-
rounded by an angry and turbulent crowd.
Terminiello, after jury trial, was convicted of violating an ordinance 2 -
of the City of Chicago by making an improper noise or diversion tend-
ing to a breach of the peace.
The trial court charged that "misbehavior may constitute a breach
" Christoffel v. U.S., 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
"Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1891) ; Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649 (1894);
Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547 (1896); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167
U.S. 196 (1897); Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); see Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939) (concurring opinion) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy,
220 U.S. 107, 143 (1910); cf. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); U.S. v.
Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
" An enrolled bill generally refers to a bill which purports to have passed both
houses of the legislature, and which has been signed by the presiding officers of the
two houses. The Supreme Court of the U.S. includes not only process of enact-
ment within the legislature itself, but also signature by the President and filing
with the Secretary of State.
169 Sup. Ct. 894 (1949).
'"All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any im-
proper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a
breach of the peace . . . shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct . . 2, , City
of Chicago, REV. CODE 1939, c. 193, §1(1).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance." The defendant took
no exception to that instruction, but maintained that the ordinance as
applied to his conduct violated his right to free speech under the Federal
Constitution. The Illirjois appellate courts found that the speech was
composed of derisive, "fighting" words, which carried it outside the
scope of the constitutional guarantees, and affirmed the conviction. 3
The United States Supreme Court did not reach the "fighting
words" issue, but held the trial court's instruction to be a binding con-
struction of state law, permitting conviction of the dlefendant if his
speech invited public dispute or brought about a condition of unrest,
and, thus construed, the ordinance was unconstitutional. That defend-
ant took no exception to the charge was held to be immaterial since he
had attacked the ordinance as a whole, and the verdict being a general
one, it could not be determined that the -defendant was not convicted
under the unconstitutional construction of the statute.
4
Mr. Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that the court, in lifting
the charge to the jury out of its context, had considered it as an abstrac-
tion, and that the charge, when given, took color from the realities
surrounding the delivery of the address. Accordingly, the jury had
found a breach of the peace of a nature not entitled to constitutional
protections.5
The First Amendment is unequivocal in its expression that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." And,
by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this
freedom is protected from impairment by the states.7
But all speech is not protected. Certain classes of speech, including
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words are punished because "their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
Chicago v. Terminiello, 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E. 2d 45 (1947), aff'd, 400
Ill. 23, 79 N. E. 2d 39 (1948).
'The court relies upon Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), where a
statute proscribed three types of conduct and a general verdict of conviction fol-
lowed. There it had been contended throughout the proceedings that one of the
proscriptions was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. All the Strombcrg
case holds is that where the validity of a statute is successfully assailed as to one
of three clauses of the statute, and all three clauses were submitted to the jury,
the general verdict has an infirmity because it cannot be assumed that the jury
convicted on the valid portion of the statute. The case offers no precedent for
searching the record for error that at no time was urged before the state court
and that was explicitly disclaimed on behalf of the defendant before the Supreme
Court. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago, 69
Sup. Ct. 894, 898 (1949).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 900 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
O U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. I.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925) ; cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Since such ut-
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Speech of public interest, including words of idea-conveying nature,
may be punished if "the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that (the state) has a right to
prevent."9  This clear and present danger test was first enunciated in
an "attempt" case to determine whether the verbal acts came close
enough to the acts described in the statute to be punished.'0 It has
since leen employed to test the validity of a statute on its face"' and
to -determine whether a conviction obtained under a statute not found
to be invalid could be sustained.12  It has been applied to test a con-
viction for common law breach of the peace. 13 However, if the statute
itself declares that certain utterances are inimical to the public welfare,
idea-conveying speech may be punished without the .necessity of satis-
fying the clear and present danger test.' 4
The propriety of the court's searching the record for error and the
question of whether the jury may have convicted Terminiello of merely
terances do not form an essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of slight
social value as a step toward truth, any benefit that may be derived from them is
outweighed by the social interests in order and morality. CHAFE, FRaE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1941). This was the rationale of the Illinois courts'
holding that Terminiello's speech was not within the constitutional guarantees;
he had referred to certain racial groups as "slimy scum," "bedbugs," and "snakes."
See State v. Warren, 113 N. C. 683, 18 S. E. 498 (1893) (an act of the Legis-
lature making it unlawful to use profane language in certain localities is not an
undue interference with freedom of speech).
'Shenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
10 Shenk v. United States, supra note 9.
" West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
12 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
1 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The test was referred to and
approved in both the majority opinion and Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion
in the instant case. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 896, 905 (1949).
The quoted expression from the Shenk case has represented the traditional
phrasing of the clear and present danger test. It has occasionally been paraphrased
to the same general effect: ". . . suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated
only when the expression presents a clear and present danger . . ." (italics mine).
See West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
Mr. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, uses the phrasing "likely to produce
a clear and present danger" (italics mine). See Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup.
Ct. 894, 896 (1949). This should not represent a departure from the principle
that "the degree of imminence of the substantive evil must be extremely high
before utterances can be punished." See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941).
1' Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Whether the "Gitlow distinc-
tion" is still the law is not clear. The Gitlow case was distinguished in Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256-258 (1937). The distinction was not applied in Tay-
lor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589 (1943) or Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 105 (1940). But the Gitlow distinction was regarded as the law in Dunne v.
United States, 138 F. 2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943),
rehearings denied, 320 U.S. 814, 815 (1944). However the appeal of the convic-
tion of the Communist leaders may provide a definitive statement as to whether
the clear and present danger test must be satisfied for a conviction under an act
such as the North Carolina Subversive Activities Statute, N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-11
(1943), discussed in 19 N. C. L. REv. 466 (1941).
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"inviting public dispute" are not the fundamental problems posed by
the Terminiello case. Rather the question is, "To what extent is con-
trol of the expression of ideas compatible with dynamic democratic
processes?" And, conversely, "How may the order requisite to the
functioning of a democratic society be maintained without restrictions
upon the abuse of the freedoms of expression ?"5
We have seen that the constitutional guarantees are not absolute, but
that speech of public interest is subject to the clear and present danger
restriction; and when the statute itself declares certain speech to be
unlawful, even that test may not need to be satisfied. Our right to
express ideas of public interest is not unqualified, but may be limited.
That is the meaning of the First Amendment as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.
This construction is inconsistent with the literal language of the
Amendment and perhaps with our traditions. 16 It is incompatible with
the interpretation that "no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no
counterbelief, no relevant information may be kept from (the voting
citizen)."17 There are those who believe that, so construed, the constitu-
tional protection is essentially stripped of its vigor.' 8
But there are others who, with equal sincerity and conviction, feel
that if the interchange of ideas contemplated by the First Amendment
is to serve its aim, their presentation must be accompanied by order;
and that the weapon of either the Facist or Communist who would over-
throw democracy is -disorder and mob action. Accordingly, they feel
that the recent cases, culminating in the Terminiello case, in their effort
to protect the freedoms of expression, are undermining the police power
that is the community's only protection from lawlessness and anarchy.1 0
1 "The problem which Lincoln cast in memorable dilemma: 'Must a government
of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain
its own existence?'" See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
596 (1940).
'x "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union, or to change its
republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."
Jefferson, First Inaugural Address.
But cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's thesis that since the people, in adopting state
constitutional provisions, have universally qualified them to make persons respon-
sible for abuse of the liberty of free speech, that is what is meant by the cryptic
phrase "freedom of speech" as used in the Federal Constitution. See Terminiello
v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 907 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
:
1t MEIKLEjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 89(1948).
"I See MEIKLEJOHN, op. cit. supra note 17 and Rosenwein, The Sutpreme Court
and Freedom of Speech, 9 LAw GUILD RFv. 70 (1949).
1" "Streets and parks maintained by the public cannot legally be denied to
groups 'for the communication of ideas.' Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ;
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). Cities may not protect their streets from
activities which the law has always regarded subject to control as nuisances
(handbill distribution cases). Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Cities may not protect the streets or even homes
[Vol. 28
NOTES AND COMMENTS
How to maintain public order without impairing our freedoms of
expression is one of the major dilemmas of our time. The public turns
to the law and to the lawyer for its solution. The lawyer can help with
the answer only when he is aware that every restriction placed upon
the free exchange of ideas of public interest, however justified, is a
restriction upon a basic right of a citizen in a free society and, further,
realizes that those elements which would overthrow our democratic
society employ disorder and mob violence as primary weapons.2 0
WILLIAM V. BuiRow.
Corporations-Process-Service on Non-Resident
Directors of Domestic Corporation
The corporation is a necessary party to a stockholders' derivative
suit against the directors for mismanagement.1 This suit has been held
to be an action in personam, 2 service not being allowed by publication
on the non-resident directors.3 Thus a long recognized problem arises :4
How can service of process be had on non-resident directors in the juris-
diction where the corporation is resident? " * * * those (directors) who
have looted and misappropriated corporate assets will be enabled to
escape liability by reason of the fact that the corporation is not doing
of their inhabitants from the aggressions of organized bands operating in large
numbers. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). . . . Neither a private
party nor a public authority can invoke otherwise valid state laws against trespass
to exclude from their property groups bent on disseminating propaganda. Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946). Picket-
ing is largely immunized from control on the ground that it is free speech, Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), and police may not regulate sound trucks
and loud-speakers, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)." See Terminiello v.
Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 907 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
20 Mr. Norman Thomas, writing out of his rich experience, said very recently,
"The heretic has always been the growing point in society. When he is repressed
by force society stagnates ...clearly our danger is not from the honest dis-
senter, but from the passions of the mob and those who manipulate it in the strug-
gle for profit and power." Thomas, The Dissenter's Role in- a Totalitarian Age,
N. Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 20, 1949, p. 13.
113 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. (PEam. ED.) §5997.
23 FLETCHER CYc. CoRp. (PER1. ED.) §1283.
'Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 Atl. 621 (1901), Southern Mills Inc. v. Arm-
strong, 223 N. C. 495, 27 S. E. 2d 281 (1943), cf. McNaughton v. Broach, 236
App Div. 448, 260 N. Y. Supp. 100 (1932). Seinble Bauer v. Parker, 82 App.
Div. 289, 81 N.Y. Supp. 995 (1903). But cf. Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359,
114 N. E. 841 (1916). Note, 148 A. L. R. 1251.
'Greer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903); see Freeman v.
Bean, 243 App. Div. 503, 276 N. Y. Supp. 310, 311 (1934) (dissenting opinion).
Report of Law Revision Commission for 1941, N. Y. La. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (I).
27 CORN. L. Q. 74 (1941) ; 22 VA. L. Rav. 153 (1935) ; 33 VA. L. REV. 187 (1947) ;
44 Y. L. J. 1041 (1934). Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir.
1947) discusses this problem in federal jurisdiction.
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